Expert Perspective: A Brief History of Pakistan’s Fight Against the TTP
This is an expert perspective written by and for our February 5, 2024 program with Adam Weinstein, Deputy Director of the Middle East Program at Quincy Institute
The views expressed are solely those of the writer and not those of PCFR, which takes no institutional position on policy.
After the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration presented Pakistan with a clear choice: you’re with us, or against us. In practical terms, this meant the U.S. wanted Pakistan’s support in overthrowing the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pakistan, led by Pervez Musharraf’s military government at the time, urged the Bush administration to reconsider occupying Afghanistan and instead collaborate with certain factions of the Taliban. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also urged1 Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader, to hand over Osama bin Laden and sever ties with al-Qaeda. However, Mullah Omar, being notably intransigent, refused. Washington went ahead with its ground invasion and Pakistan became a skeptical partner in the opening salvo of the U.S. War on Terror.
The U.S. invasion put Pakistan in a delicate position. Pakistan had friendly ties with the Afghan Taliban and distrusted Washington’s new partners in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance. The new Afghan government viewed Pakistan with suspicion and, to Islamabad’s dismay, sought closer ties with India. Although Pakistan facilitated NATO supplies into Afghanistan, its intelligence services maintained close connections and offered support to the Afghan Taliban, particularly the militant Haqqani Network.
Despite substantial military aid from the U.S., especially during the peak of the Afghan war, Washington was aware that Pakistan’s security establishment was hedging its bets, or double-dealing, depending who is describing it. Pakistan provided logistical support to the U.S. while also backing elements of the Afghan Taliban. However, due to Afghanistan’s landlocked location, tribal areas straddling the border, and Washington’s strained relations with Iran, maintaining a working relationship with Islamabad remained essential to prosecuting the war.
Starting in 2007, an array of militant groups coalesced to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)2, popularly known as the Pakistani Taliban. The period from 2007 to 2015 witnessed a dramatic surge in violence3 within Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Pakistanis, reaching its zenith in 2009-10. Pakistani cities experienced a wave of suicide blasts and truck bombings. In 2008, the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad fell victim to a truck bomb attack that claimed 54 lives, including 3 Americans. The TTP successfully seized control of the Swat Valley, gaining global attention4 in 2012 when they targeted Malala Yusufzai, who later won the Nobel Peace Prize for her resistence of the group’s restrictions on girls’ education.
In 2014, TTP gunmen asaulted an army public school5 in Peshawar, resulting in the deaths of 148 people, predominantly children. This incident in particular galvanized Pakistani society against what they perceived as a lenient approach to terrorists in the preceding years. The Pakistani military responded with Operation Zarb-e-Azb, initiated in 2014, successfully pushing back the TTP and significantly reducing violence in the country in the subsequent years. Additionally, U.S. military actions, including drone strikes in 2013 and 20186, eliminated TTP chiefs and aided Pakistan in its efforts.
By the time the U.S. signed the Doha Agreement with the Afghan Taliban in February 2020, leading to the full withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021, violence in Pakistan had significantly decreased. Over the years, the Pakistani state had publicly expressed concern about the impact of the U.S. war in Afghanistan on Pakistan and had advocated for a political resolution. However, in the later stages of the war, Pakistan had grown comfortable with the situation. The Afghan government was relatively weak, unable to pose a substantial challenge. Although most U.S. troops had left Afghanistan, a sufficient presence remained to maintain control. Crucially, the TTP had been considerably weakened, and violence inside Pakistan had substantially decreased.
The possibility of a U.S. troop withdrawal raised concerns within certain segments of the Pakistani state. In September 2020, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post7, cautioning against a hasty withdrawal. Nevertheless, after the withdrawal took place in August 2021 and Afghanistan swiftly fell to the Taliban, the Pakistani state hoped that its connections, especially with the leaders of the Haqqani Network, would safeguard its interests. However, this initial hope began to erode as the TTP, emboldened by the Afghan Taliban’s victory, escalated attacks against Pakistan’s security services. The number of attacks saw a significant year-on-year increase from 2021 to 2023, and two ceasefires between the TTP and Pakistan were abruptly terminated by the TTP. Contrary to the expectations of the Pakistani state, the Afghan Taliban has largely shown unwillingness to restrain the TTP who now use Afghanistan as a safehaven.
Pakistan now stands isolated in its struggle against the TTP. U.S. drones are no longer patrolling the border region, ready to target and eliminate TTP leaders, and Washington largely views the TTP as a domestic problem for Pakistan. The international community is more preoccupied with the Afghan Taliban’s oppressive social policies than its support for the TTP. As violence surges in Pakistan, it remains uncertain how the Pakistani state can effectively bring it under control.
Some in Washington see this situation as a fitting consequence for a Pakistani state that did not fully commit to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and, at times, supported militants fighting against U.S. soldiers. Others find it worrisome. Opinions within Pakistan vary, with some viewing the country as a victim of the world’s abandonment of Afghanistan, reminiscent of the 1990s. Others see the TTP as the result of a clumsy approach to terrorism and excessive trust placed in the Afghan Taliban. What is undeniable is that the TTP problem is gradually worsening, and should the TTP cooperate with groups like al-Qaeda or become more emboldened, the consequences could reach beyond Pakistan.
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